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Abstract Robot manufacturers will be required to
Q1
Q2
1
demonstrate objectively that all reasonably foresee-2
able hazards have been identified in any robotic prod-3
uct design that is to be marketed commercially. This4
is problematic for autonomous mobile robots because5
conventional methods, which have been developed6
for automatic systems do not assist safety analysts7
in identifying non-mission interactions with environ-8
mental features that are not directly associated with9
the robot’s design mission, and which may comprise10
the majority of the required tasks of autonomous11
robots. In this paper we develop a new variant of12
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preliminary hazard analysis that is explicitly aimed 13
at identifying non-mission interactions by means of 14
new sets of guidewords not normally found in exist- 15
ing variants. We develop the required features of the 16
method and describe its application to several small 17
trials conducted at Bristol Robotics Laboratory in the 18
2011–2012 period. 19
Keywords Hazard analysis · Environmental survey · 20
Autonomous · Mobile robot · Safety 21
1 Introduction 22
As autonomous mobile robots become a commer- 23
cial reality, attention must be paid to the problem 24
of assuring their safety. In almost every application 25
of mobile robots other than toys, the size, power or 26
speed of robots will be such that potential hazards 27
will be associated with their operation or malfunction. 28
Legal regulations in most countries require that any 29
such safety critical system be designed so as to reduce 30
the risk of accidents caused by these hazards to less 31
than some required threshold, or at least as low as is 32
reasonably practicable. 33
The achievement of safety in engineering systems 34
requires a combination of different approaches of 35
safety requirements specification, analysis, design and 36
manufacturing inspections, and product testing. The 37
objective of these is to determine what hazards are 38
associated with the system, to specify and implement 39
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features of the design that act to reduce the probability40
of an accident, and then to confirm whether each prod-41
uct that is actually manufactured does indeed possess42
the intended properties when operating in its intended43
environment(s).44
This paper presents the results of recent research45
performed by the authors at Bristol Robotics Lab-46
oratory (BRL) into methods of analysis of robotic47
systems for the identification of potential hazards48
associated with autonomous operation in diverse envi-49
ronments. Much of the work was carried out as a back-50
ground activity to the European INTRO project (www.51
introbotics.eu), and some work as internal research52
and postgraduate projects solely within BRL. The53
results of the application of Hazard Analysis in54
INTRO research conducted in BRL is summarized55
in the work of [10]. Several studies have been per-56
formed on different robotic applications, and lessons57
learned in early efforts have resulted in proposals for a58
new method, Environmental Surveys, which have then59
been applied in later trials. In this paper, we present60
the work that was performed, and draw conclusions61
about the effectiveness of the new method and ideas62
for future work that emerge from these studies.63
1.1 The INTRO Project64
INTRO (www.introbotics.eu) seeks to better under-65
stand issues in Human-Robot interaction and, ulti-66
mately, endow the robot with cognitive and physical67
intelligence sufficient to deal with complex situations68
and safety of typical interactions. The 4 year long, Ini-69
tial Training Network project, sponsored by the Euro-70
pean Commission*, has trained 8 young researchers71
to prepare them for careers in the fast developing area72
of service robotics. They explored various aspects of73
interactions - from learning by demonstration, inten-74
tion and emotion recognition, to gesture analysis,75
intelligent interfaces and safety factors. The individ-76
ual topics will be integrated into two different sce-77
narios designed and developed by two post-doctoral78
researchers on the project employed by two European79
robotic companies – Space Applications (Belgium)80
and Robosoft (France). The two scenarios – Search81
and Rescue and Robot-waiter have been selected to82
be best to demonstrate what robots need to do in sit-83
uations that require communication between humans84
and the robot and that are placed in noisy and dynamic 85
environments. In both cases, hazards and faults are 86
inevitable. 87
1.2 Industry Safety Standards for Autonomous Robots 88
In addition to existing research into safety issues for 89
mobile autonomous robots, BRL has also supported 90
UK participation in the ISO TC184 SC2 (Robots and 91
robotic devices) committee in its development of a 92
new industry standard ISO 13482 [22], which spec- 93
ifies safety requirements for (non-medical) personal 94
care applications of service robots. These include 95
domestic service robots, physical assistant robots 96
(e.g. exoskeleton-type assistive robots or human load- 97
sharing mobile robots) and person carrier robots 98
(autonomous mobile passenger carts). The standard 99
includes lists of hazards that are predicted to be com- 100
monly encountered, so standard levels of safety per- 101
formance can be specified that can offer a baseline 102
performance level which can be assessed and certified. 103
ISO 13482 is due for public release in late-2013, and 104
at time of writing is in its final draft stage. The work in 105
this paper is intended to supplement the publication of 106
the standard by offering guidance on how to perform 107
the hazard identification task for the kinds of robots 108
covered by ISO 13482. 109
1.3 Structure of this Paper 110
In Section 2 of this paper we review existing work 111
on the topic of hazard identification of autonomous 112
mobile robots. In Section 3 of this paper, we present a 113
review of current methods for functional hazard anal- 114
ysis, as developed in numerous existing (non-robotic) 115
industry sectors. In Section 4 we present the initial 116
hazard analysis study, and we discuss the problems 117
facing the task of hazard identification for systems that 118
operate autonomously in open environments, which 119
led us to develop the new method of Environmen- 120
tal Surveys. In the Section 5 we present the new 121
method and in Section 6 we present its initial trials. In 122
Sections 7 and 8 we discuss the results and present our 123
conclusions about the effectiveness of the work and 124
how it should progress in the future. 125
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2 Background126
In this section we discuss the main safety issues asso-127
ciated with designing an autonomous service robot.128
2.1 Safety of Autonomous Robotic Systems129
Autonomous robots are a class of robot system which130
may have one or more of the following properties:131
adaptation to changes in the environment; planning132
for future events; learning new tasks; and mak-133
ing informed decisions without human intervention.134
Although commercially available autonomous robots135
are still few, [12] report that there is increasing136
demand for both personal robots for the home and137
service robots for industry.138
At present, much of the research into robotic safety139
is looking at improving design of safety mechanisms,140
for example collision avoidance [19, 24] or fault141
detection and tolerance Petterson 2005, object manip-Q3 142
ulation [13], or human contact safety [17]. This has143
led researchers to suggest that safety of human-robot144
interaction requires both high-precision sensory infor-145
mation and fast reaction times, in order to work with146
and around humans [11, 25]. Work by [2] suggests that147
for autonomous systems to support humans as peers,148
while maintaining safety, robot actions may need to be149
restricted, preventing optimum flexibility and perfor-150
mance. Other work in robotic safety focuses on risk151
quantification, for example [16] and [21].152
In contrast, our work is concerned with initial153
identification of hazards and their associated safety154
requirements. It is not concerned with risk assessment,155
or the design and implementation of safety mecha-156
nisms and fault detection such as the work described157
by Petterson 2005. The only work we are aware of,158
which is similar to this paper, is that of Guiochet and159
Baron [14], Guiochet et al. [15], Martin-Guillerez-et160
al. [28] (see Section 2.2 for a detailed discussion).161
One of the principle requirements for dependability162
in autonomous robots is robustness. This means being163
able to handle errors and to continue operation during164
abnormal conditions Lussier et al. 2004. To achieve165
this it is important that the system should be able to166
support changes to its task specification [4]. These167
changes are necessary as, in a dynamic environment,168
the robot will frequently find itself in a wide range169
of previously unseen situations. While this is not a170
subject covered in this paper, our work does also lead 171
us to similar conclusions – see Section 8.2. 172
It is clear from the literature that little research has 173
been done on the day-to-day operation of personal 174
robots, and all the safety risks associated with this. 175
One reason why this may be the case, is that cur- 176
rently personal robots are only tested in ‘mock’ home 177
conditions that have been heavily structured and the 178
majority of real world hazards removed. Therefore 179
there has been no need to conduct a survey of many of 180
the real environments, in which personal robots may 181
be required to operate. 182
2.2 Results of Robot Studies Using Hazard Analysis 183
One of the few research works for hazard analysis 184
of service robots has been published by [15]. Their 185
research considers the MIRAS RobuWalker, which is 186
a robotic assistant for helping people stand up from 187
a seated position and support them while walking. 188
The RobuWalker can be used in two modes, a user 189
controlled mode and an automation mode. The user 190
controlled mode is used when the human is supported 191
by the robot in a standing position. The automated 192
mode is required when the human is in a seated posi- 193
tion. This mode allows the user to request the robot 194
to move from its stored position, which could be any- 195
where in the room, to the location where the human 196
making the request is located. This involves the robot 197
navigating the environment with no assistance from 198
the user. Based on the hazard analysis results that 199
have been published, it is clear that only hazards asso- 200
ciated with the normal operation of the robot have 201
been considered. For example there are no hazards 202
recorded associated with other non-task related enti- 203
ties that may be present in the robot’s operating area. 204
This issue of not analysing hazards that are not directly 205
associated with the robot’s task has also been iden- 206
tified in other projects. A study by [6] examined a 207
therapeutic robot for disabled children. To analyse the 208
safety of this device, the researchers used the hazard 209
analysis technique HAZOP. This method examined 210
how the child and robot would interact and considered 211
the potential safety risks. However, as with the pre- 212
vious example, no consideration is given to the types 213
of hazard that the robot may encounter outside the 214
predefined tasks. 215
The PHRIENDS project [1, 28] performed haz- 216
ard analysis on a wheel-based mobile robot with a 217
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manipulator arm that was designed to pick up and218
move objects around the environment. This robot,219
which was required to work collaboratively with220
a human user, was designed to safely navigate a221
dynamic environment that could contain multiple222
humans. This represents the largest scale hazard anal-223
ysis of a personal robot found in the literature. Their224
analysis considered the safety risks of the robot from225
a number of positions, including the potential haz-226
ards of each major component of the robot failing, the227
risks associated with human users, and the types and228
severity of collisions that may occur.229
As has been discussed in this paper, traditional haz-230
ard analysis methods for service robots can result in231
safety risks outside the normal operating scenarios232
being missed. To address this issue, research by [38]233
has proposed the use of a hazard analysis check list.234
This check list highlights a number of environmen-235
tal and user risks that need to be considered when236
assessing the risk of a personal robot. Although this237
research concludes that the check list cannot be shown238
to identify all the potential safety risks.239
The following section presents the findings of the240
experiments conducted at the BRL, and discusses their241
implications for the safety analysis of service robots.242
3 Hazard Identification Analysis243
Hazard identification analysis (often referred to sim-244
ply as ‘hazard identification’ or ‘hazard analysis’)245
is required as a safety assurance activity during the246
requirements specification and early design stages247
of any safety critical system (it is often required as248
a mandatory activity by industry safety standards).249
This section provides an overview of the subject,250
and discusses the issues that affect the analysis of251
autonomous mobile robots.252
3.1 Conventional Theory and Methodology253
In most countries, national laws require that all reason-254
able steps be taken to ensure that products or processes255
sold to consumers or used in workplaces are safe as far256
as is reasonably practicable. Depending on the legal257
codes and practices of a given nation, the mandate for258
“reasonableness” is either written explicitly into leg-259
islation as in the UK Health & Safety at Work and260
Consumer Protection Acts [36, 37] or it is implicit261
within the legal code as in many other European coun- 262
tries [8]. In either case, the result is the same – it is 263
incumbent on manufacturers and employers to ensure 264
that risks are reduced “so far as reasonably practica- 265
ble (SFAIRP)” or “as low as reasonably practicable 266
(ALARP)” (these terms are synonymous, but the latter 267
is more popular). It is generally considered, at least in 268
the UK [8], that the risk of harm cannot be reduced 269
as low as reasonably practicable unless the following 270
can be shown objectively (i.e. without allowance for 271
any personal qualities of a manufacturer, employer, or 272
vendor): 273
• the harm was not foreseeable, 274
• the safety measures taken were not reasonably 275
practicable, or 276
• the harm was outside the scope of the undertaking 277
(manufacturers/employers are not liable for that 278
which is outside the scope of their responsibility). 279
Of these three criteria, the first and third present par- 280
ticular challenges to developers of mobile autonomous 281
robots, and are the ultimate objectives to which the 282
methods proposed in this paper are dedicated. 283
In order to satisfy these criteria, engineers perform 284
a variety of safety assurance tasks during the design 285
of a safety critical system. Methods and processes 286
for safety-directed design and testing are outside the 287
scope of this paper, but safety assurance also includes 288
a number of procedures to identify potential sources 289
of harm, and for delineating the scope of consideration 290
to the boundaries of the manufacturer’s responsibility. 291
These methods and procedures are generally referred 292
to as hazard analysis or hazard identification. 293
3.1.1 Background on Hazard Identification 294
The hazard identification process is the start of the 295
safety assurance process of any safety critical sys- 296
tem. The general objective of hazard identification is 297
to define all the possible hazards that might occur 298
in a system throughout its operational life. However, 299
the unbounded definition of the operational time and 300
of the environment of a system means that it cannot 301
be guaranteed formally whether all possible hazards 302
have been identified. So typical hazard analysis meth- 303
ods seek to try and provide a systematic classification 304
of hazards, which can identify all the logical types 305
of hazards but not all the specific instances of haz- 306
ards (the events themselves), which safety assurance 307
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engineers must determine based on their knowledge308
and intuition.309
Hazard identification is first started at an early stage310
in the system development process, typically once the311
initial version of the system requirements specifica-312
tion is available. Hazard identification analysis done313
at this stage is often referred to as Preliminary Haz-314
ard Analysis or Identification (PHA or PHI), because315
it is often the case that the only design information316
available for analysis are the most abstract (high level)317
and basic functional requirements defining what the318
system is to do – details about the general nature of319
the actuation mechanisms or the interfaces between320
the system and its environment have not yet been321
specified. Later, as the general physical structure is322
defined and the details of the boundary interfaces323
are specified, the hazard analysis is often referred to324
as Functional or System Hazard Analysis (FHA or325
SHA).326
3.1.2 Contemporary Hazard Identification327
Methodologies – a Review328
A number of variants of preliminary and functional329
hazard identification methods have been developed330
over the years, often for different industrial sectors331
reflecting the particular technological domains, design332
practices, conventions and terminology. This section333
describes the general principles, and reviews some of334
the more widely used methods from different industry335
sectors.336
Hazard Identification Analysis – General Principles337
The aim of hazard analysis is to identify all plausible338
and reasonably foreseeable hazards associated with a339
system’s operation in its environment. For identifica-340
tion of functional hazards this is typically achieved by341
two general approaches, which are canonical so their342
use is equivalent in functional term.343
The two approaches are based on two variations344
in the modelling of failures and their effects within345
system functional models, which are illustrated in346
Fig. 1. In general, system functions are modelled as347
input/output processes encapsulated within the sys-348
tem’s boundary and interacting with the outside world349
via the system interface. Hazards arising from defects350
within the system can then be modelled by defining351
failure conditions of the elements of the system model,352
in the two respective viewpoints.353
The first approach – the function-oriented view- 354
is to model failures as defects of the functional pro- 355
cesses. The requirements of each system function are 356
inspected, and fault or error conditions associated 357
with each requirement are identified and assessed for 358
their consequences on the external environment via 359
the system interfaces. The hazard analysis builds up a 360
classification table or diagram of system failure con- 361
ditions on a function-by-function basis, with interface 362
behaviour being a secondary description within each 363
function-based classification category. 364
In contrast, the second approach – the interface- 365
oriented view – models failure conditions at the 366
boundary interface of the system. Fault or error con- 367
ditions are identified for all the parameters that define 368
the interface, and the consequences of each parame- 369
ter failure on the performance of the system functions 370
is assessed for its consequences, and the hazard anal- 371
ysis table or diagram is built up in terms of system 372
interfaces and the failure of their parameters. 373
With respect to system functional safety, the two 374
approaches are canonical: a system failure cannot have 375
any effect on safety unless it affects the way in which 376
the system interacts with the outside environment. An 377
internal fault or error that causes no change in the 378
behaviour of the system at its interface to the out- 379
side world has no effect on safety, so the only defects 380
that are of interest are those where failure conditions 381
at the boundary are paired with failure conditions of 382
functional processes, so if one can provide a com- 383
plete classification of either then all relevant failure 384
conditions will be identified. 385
Example of Function-oriented Hazard Identification – 386
Aircraft Industry FHA Functional Hazard Assessment 387
(FHA) was originally developed in the aerospace sec- 388
tor, although the name and methods have been carried 389
across to other industries. The standard procedures 390
and practices for performing this method in the civil 391
aerospace sector have been codified in the ARP 4761 392
standard [3]. The general approach is to examine 393
the functional requirements specification of a system, 394
and then to identify three generic failure conditions 395
associated with each functional requirement: 396
• Failure to operate as/when intended 397
• Unintended or inadvertent operation 398
• Malfunction (a.k.a. misleading function) 399
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Fig. 1 Canonical
representations of failures
typically used in hazard
identification analysis
System boundary
System
System 
Function A
Outputs
Inputs
Bi-directional Flows
System interface
System
Failure of 
Function A
Outputs
Inputs
Bi-directional Flows
System functions 
(described by functional 
requirements) cause 
changes in the flows across 
the system boundary 
interface, which affects 
system behaviour.
System failure behaviour 
can be modelled by 
describing failure 
conditions in the operation 
of system functions.
System
Outputs
Inputs
Bi-directional Flows
Output error(s) due to failure of 
Function A
Input errors causing failure of 
Function A
Flow errors that are either a 
cause or an effect of a failure of 
Function A
Alternatively, system failure behaviour can be modelled (canonically) by describing 
boundary flow errors that cause or arise from failures of internal system functions.
Function-oriented View
Interface-oriented View
System Modelling
Failure of 
Function A
The method proceeds by generating three hypothet-400
ical failure conditions (one of each type) for each401
functional requirements of the system. Hypothetical402
conditions that are implausible can be ignored, but403
for all others a precise description of the failure404
condition is defined. Then, for each failure condi-405
tion the consequences of the condition are identified.406
Since the nature of the system’s environment often407
varies throughout the operational use of a system,408
the consequences are assessed over different parti-409
tions of the system mission (in an aircraft these are410
its flight phases such as take-off, landing, cruise, etc.)411
in order to identify different consequences of the 412
same failure condition if it was to occur in different 413
environmental circumstances. The severity of harm of 414
each distinct consequence is determined, usually in 415
terms of the number and degree of injuries caused to 416
persons (crew, passengers or third parties). These haz- 417
ard identification results are then used as the basis of 418
a risk assessment, where the probability of occurrence 419
of each failure condition is assessed and if found to 420
present an unacceptable risk then the system function 421
can be redesigned so as to eliminate the problem, or 422
safeguards built into the design to reduce the expected 423
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probability of occurrence to such a level that the risk424
is acceptable. The results of the FHA are usually pre-425
sented in tabular format similar to the example shown426
in Table 1.427
Example of Interface-oriented Hazard Identification –428
HAZOP One of the most widely known interface-429
oriented analysis methods is HAZOP (HAZard and430
Operability studies). This method was originally431
developed in the chemical process control industry,432
and has since been codified in the IEC 61882 stan-433
dard [20]. As discussed earlier, HAZOP proceeds434
by a systematic analysis of failure conditions in the435
flow parameters across the boundary interface of the436
system. In general, flows are any information (data,437
signals), energy (electrical or mechanical power), fluid438
flow (chemical reagents, fuel), or mechanical force439
(structural loads and stresses, mechanical actions) that440
pass across the system boundary.441
HAZOP identifies a number of guidewords which442
have the same role as the generic failure conditions443
of aerospace industry FHA. Guidewords are gener-444
ally tailored to the technological domain of the sys-445
tem being analysed, i.e. different keyword sets for446
electrical/hydraulic/pneumatic/mechanical machines,447
fluid dynamical interfaces or mechanisms, analogue448
or digital electronics, software processes. However,449
most keywords relate to the flow of energy, force,450
information, or physical material across the system451
boundary interface, and generally identify deviations452
in the value, timing, or provision of service across a453
boundary interface. The guidewords that were origi-454
nally identified for the original HAZOP version (as455
specified in IEC 61882 [20]) are listed in Table 2.456
The method proceeds by developing an interpre-457
tation table for the flow parameters of the system,458
where the keywords are applied to the parameter459
types and specific definitions of the failure conditions460
are defined, if the combination is plausible. Some461
examples of guideword interpretations are provided in462
Table 3. Then the relevant interpretations are applied463
to the parameters of the boundary interface and the464
effects on system functions and consequences on its465
interaction with the environment are assessed. The466
results are tabulated in a similar manner to the format467
shown in Table 1.468
Since HAZOP was originally developed for indus-469
trial process control systems, variants of HAZOP have470
been proposed for computer systems and software,471
which follow the same general methodology but pro- 472
pose guidewords that are more appropriate for flows 473
of data and electronic signals than fluid and mechan- 474
ical forces. Two variants of note are defined in the 475
UK Defence Standard 00-58 [35] and the SHARD 476
Method, developed at the University of York [32]. The 477
former uses the same guideword set as basic HAZOP 478
but offers guidance that is more tailored to the study of 479
computer-based systems. The latter is notable in that it 480
proposes a different set of guidewords developed from 481
a survey of computer/software failure cases. The new 482
guidewords are related to the functional service that 483
is provided through a given flow parameter, and are 484
described in Table 4. 485
Although the guideword set is different to HAZOP, 486
the procedural methodology of SHARD is otherwise 487
unchanged, with interpretation tables being developed 488
for the range of software/electronic interface flow 489
parameter types, and then the specific failure condi- 490
tions being applied to the actual parameters of each 491
such interface to determine the functional failures and 492
their consequences. 493
The SHARD guideword set is interesting; its defi- 494
nition of failure types in service provision terms and 495
flow behaviour terms is (respectively) both function- 496
oriented and interface-oriented. This was one of the 497
reasons why the SHARD guideword set was used in 498
the initial hazard analysis studies of a robot waiter at 499
BRL, which are described in Section 4. 500
3.1.3 Other Keyword Based Safety Analyses: FMEA 501
Hazard analysis is not the only safety analysis tech- 502
nique to use a keyword-driven approach – another 503
widely used technique is Failure Modes and Effects 504
Analysis (FMEA). FMEA differs from FHA in two 505
principal ways – the keyword set and the level of 506
design detail used as the information on which the 507
analysis is based. FMEA is typically applied at a much 508
later stage of system development, when a detailed 509
design is available for the system and its compo- 510
nents. The keywords used are often related to very 511
specific fault types of physical components (e.g. short- 512
circuit faults, varying parameter values). FMEA was 513
employed as a safety analysis technique on one of the 514
BRL projects discussed in this paper. In one of the 515
SAR robot design studies, FMEA was used to analyse 516
a particular robot task (tele-operated navigation). 517
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For example, in the SAR Robot design problem, an518
initial assumption was that when the rescuer offers a519
piece of rubble he or she knows the robot gripping520
size capacity. However, it is possible that a fatigued521
rescue worker picks a wrong-size piece of rubble and522
passes it to the robot. Thus, the robot needs a soft-523
ware module to assess the offered piece. As an initial524
design step, Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA – see525
Appendix A) was used to identify interaction-related526
tasks, to define a basis on which possible failure527
modes can be identified using FMEA. A well-known528
task analysis approach, HTA provides a description529
of the system operations toward achieving system end530
goal by clarifying relationships between tasks and531
sub-task and their order of execution [23]. The task532
hierarchy is developed by assigning ultimate goal of533
the system at top and then defining each tasks involved534
in goal attainment. In each level, a plan describes535
the order of execution of tasks. FMEA was originally536
established for system components reliability analysis537
and later its application extended to human error anal-538
ysis. This technique provides compact information539
about the system failures in a tabular format. Hence, it540
was expected to be a strong tool to address failures of541
both sides of interaction; the robot and a human res-542
cuer. One row of the obtained FMEA table [34] for543
one of the tasks failure is presented in Table 5. Fail-544
ure of tele-operated navigation is when operator tries545
to send the robot to a position, while the robot obsta-546
cle avoidance module prevents it to move to get there.547
This failure can be due to either lack of the operator’s548
situation awareness or a fault in the robot reasoning or549
sensory information.550
This analysis provides a concise frame work for 551
investigating different aspects of the system, qualita- 552
tively. FMEA outcome is fed to a Fault Tree Analysis 553
(FTA) to investigate the role of each involved element 554
for each revealed failures modes. Originally devel- 555
oped in the aerospace and defence industries, FTA 556
is a powerful method utilized to assess reliability of 557
multifaceted systems. A tree-like diagram structure 558
is used to demonstrate the contribution of the basic 559
events and their relative importance in a specific sys- 560
tem failure mode. A fault tree is developed for each 561
failure mode revealed in the FMEA. For each tree, 562
the relationship between contributed elements toward 563
the system failure is described by Boolean algebra 564
and finding minimal cutest expression. This analysis 565
can potentially provide both qualitative and quantita- 566
tive frameworks for prioritizing role and importance 567
of each faulty component. Although qualitative FTA 568
has been insightful, performing a quantitative analy- 569
sis is faced a serious challenge of finding failure and 570
success rates and probabilities. For hardware com- 571
ponents it is possible to have such data based on 572
their reliability tests, nonetheless, finding failure rate 573
of software modules and human error probability is 574
far more difficult and challenging. Even the perfor- 575
mance of hardware components can differ from their 576
published reliability values when the robot is in an 577
unpredictable and dynamic disaster environment. It is 578
also noteworthy that qualitative FTA has been per- 579
formed for a semi-autonomous robot and based on a 580
certain restricted scenario [26] in which all the basic 581
events have been predicted in advance, while for a 582
fully autonomous robot predicting all the basic events 583
is difficult to achieve. 584
Table 2 HAZOP generic
guidewords t2.1Guide word Meaning
t2.2No or not Complete negation of the design intent
t2.3More Quantitative increase
t2.4Less Quantitative decrease
t2.5As well as Qualitative modification/increase
t2.6Part of Qualitative modification/decrease
t2.7Reverse Logical opposite of the design intent
t2.8Other than Complete substitution
t2.9Early Relative to the clock time
t2.10Late Relative to the clock time
t2.11Before Relating to order or sequence
t2.12After Relating to order or sequence
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Table 3 Sample HAZOP guideword interpretation table t3.1
t3.2Parameter/ More Less None Reverse As well as Part of Other
t3.3guide word than
t3.4Flow high flow low flow no flow reverse deviating contamination deviating
t3.5flow concentration material
t3.6Pressure high low vacuum delta-p explosion
t3.7pressure pressure
t3.8Temperature high low
t3.9temperature temperature
t3.10Level high level low level no level different level
t3.11Time too long/ too short/ sequence backwards missing extra actions wrong
t3.12too late too soon step skipped actions time
4 Initial Experiments in Hazard Analysis585
of Robots – Robot Waiter Application586
The research at BRL began as an exercise to support587
the authors’ contributions to the development of the588
ISO 13482 industrial safety standard for mobile ser-589
vice robots. The standard includes a list of hazards that590
are expected to be common to many robot designs, and591
the original aim of the exercise was to conduct a haz-592
ard analysis of a proposed design to determine other593
possible hazards that could be submitted to the list. A594
partial mobile robot application design was developed595
to a point where a preliminary hazard analysis could596
be conducted, although it was not envisaged that the597
design would be taken through to full implementation.598
The original intent of the analysis study was to599
apply existing hazard analysis techniques that have600
been developed for conventional industrial systems,601
with the secondary aim of evaluating the suitability of602
existing design and analysis methods to autonomous603
system applications. However, the attempt revealed604
a number of problems, the result of which was the605
proposal of a new method.606
In this section we describe the specification of the 607
robotic application that we studied, the hazard analysis 608
technique that was applied, and we discuss the results 609
that were obtained from the analysis sessions. 610
4.1 Robot Waiter Task Specification 611
Preliminary hazard analysis requires at least a high- 612
level/abstract system model on which to operate, so 613
it was necessary to produce a basic specification and 614
architecture model of the Robot Waiter as input to 615
the PHA process. A basic task specification of the 616
robot was developed using Hierarchical Task Analy- 617
sis (HTA, see Appendix A) and a preliminary system 618
architecture model was developed using the NASA 619
Goddard Agent Architecture reference model (see 620
Appendix B). This allowed a basic identification of the 621
functional processes that might serve as architectural 622
components of such a system. The task-process model 623
was then taken as the basis for the PHA. The Robot 624
Waiter task involves an autonomous mobile robot act- 625
ing as a human waiter, delivering drinks to a human 626
customer. Specifically this requires the robot to be 627
Table 4 SHARD generic guidewords t4.1
t4.2Service failure Guideword Meaning
t4.3Service provision Omission Functional service not provided when intended
t4.4Commission Functional service provided when not intended
t4.5Service timing Early Functional service provided earlier than intended
t4.6Late Functional service provided later than intended
t4.7Service value Coarse Value of functional service parameters is coarsely incorrect (illegal value)
t4.8Subtle Value of functional service parameters is subtly incorrect (value is legal but incorrect)
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Table 5 The first row of the FMEA table t5.1
t5.2Task Failure Causes Fault/error Failure effect Potential Severity
t5.3mode type recovery type
t5.41.1-Tele-operated Paradox Lack of situation Human- Unreachable Rollback-Roll Marginal
t5.5Navigation awareness made Destination/ forward,
t5.6Damage to Compensation
t5.7Robot
t5.8
t5.9Incomplete Rescuer out of the Human- Rollback-Roll Marginal
t5.10Input field of view made forward
t5.11Delayed Delayed/ Hardware Rollback- Roll Marginal
t5.12Input Disrupted forward
t5.13Communication
t5.14No Input Camera doesn’t Hardware No Recovery: Critical
t5.15Work repair action
t5.16required
t5.17Paradox Ranger/Proximity Hardware Rollback- Roll Marginal
t5.18Sensor Fault forward, Isolation
capable of taking a drink order from a customer, fetch-628
ing the correct drink and finally delivering the drink to629
the customer. In defining the Robot Waiter task spec-630
ification a number of assumptions were made about631
the robots design and operating environment. These632
assumptions are as follows:633
In order to maintain consistency between differ-634
ent design studies, these assumptions should be car-635
ried over to future work. The following section dis-636
cusses the functional design of the Robot Waiter taskQ4 637
(Table 6). The HTA results for the Robot Waiter638
task are included in Extension 1 to the online ver-639
sion of this paper. The hierarchical decomposition640
of the robot’s tasks in textual form is provided in a641
tabular form in Extension 2. This table starts from642
the top level Task 0 “Deliver Ordered Drink to Cus-643
tomer”. This top level task is achieved by performing644
the sub-tasks of waiting in the waiting location and645
scanning the room for a customer, attending the cus-646
tomer to take a drink order, getting the requested647
drink from the bar, delivering the drink to the cus-648
tomer, and then asking the customer if everything649
is satisfactory. The analysis also considers some of650
the principal error situations that may occur in per-651
forming this service, such as where the requested652
drink is unavailable at the bar, or if the customer653
is missing when the drink is delivered. Each task is654
assigned a Behaviour Type, which classifies the task655
according to the NASA Goddard Agent Architecture 656
Model [33] – see Appendix B and Table 14. This 657
model has been used to identify the nature of the cog- 658
nitive processes that are required in order to perform 659
the task. This model allows other design analyses such 660
as preliminary functional failure / hazard analyses to 661
be performed without requiring explicit details about 662
the implementation, which are not available at this 663
stage of development. 664
4.2 Robot Waiter Functional Architecture Model 665
The functional architecture of the Robot Waiter was 666
developed by a three-step procedure: 667
a) Identify the Behaviour Type of each task, as 668
defined in the NASA Goddard Agent Model (see 669
Table 14) 670
b) For each task, identify the cognitive processes 671
employed within the task, as implied by the task 672
behaviour type and the relevant processes for that 673
type as shown in Figs. 9–16 of Appendix B. 674
c) For each cognitive process, identify any essen- 675
tial parameters or global variables used by the 676
process, any special hardware required, and the 677
data flow across the boundary of the process (the 678
interface). 679
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Table 6 BRL Robot waiter study - design assumptions t6.1
t6.2Category Assumptions
t6.3Mechanical assumptions • The robot will have only one manipulator for carrying drinks.
t6.4• The robot will transport drinks in an internal compartment.
t6.5Environmental assumptions • All drinks to be served will be placed in specific areas on a table surface (the bar),
t6.6which are pre-determined and known by (programmed into) the robot.
t6.7• The environment is a single-storey flat surface with no stairs to be climbed.
t6.8• An area of the environment is reserved as a waiting location while the robot is not serving customers.
t6.9• A number of specific environments were envisaged for the robot:
t6.10◦ A laboratory lounge area
t6.11◦ A restaurant
t6.12◦ A bar
t6.13◦ A demonstration area of a robotics conference
t6.14◦ At home
t6.15• It is assumed that drinks will be provided in the following types of container:
t6.16a) A stiff polystyrene cup, of cylindrical or inverted (upside-down) conic section profile,
t6.17with a lid attached to the top and without any handles
t6.18b) A near-cylindrical plastic bottle (e.g. mineral water bottle) with no handles
t6.19• It is assumed that bar tables will have their own drainage to capture spilled drinks,
t6.20or that any such spillages will be promptly cleaned up by bar staff. It is assumed that spillages
t6.21at the bar table will not leak onto the cafe´ / restaurant main floor.
t6.22Operational assumptions • The robot will only have a drinks serving (waiter) role; drinks preparation (bartending)
t6.23role is outside the scope of this design. It is assumed that requested drinks will be prepared and placed
t6.24into the correct areas on the bar by another agent – the bartender – who may be human or artificial.
t6.25• The robot will take an order, transport and serve a drink one at a time.
t6.26• The robot will wait to be called (reactive), not to offer drinks proactively.
t6.27• The robot may optionally hand over drink to customer, place drink on a table, or leave drink on tray.
t6.28No special behaviour is required for particular drinks, for example if they were to be served
t6.29in different mugs, cups and saucers, or other types of drink container. It is assumed that all types
t6.30of drinks to be served can be handled in the same manner, and that no special behaviour is required
t6.31because a drink is hot, cold, or unusually delicate in some manner.
The result of this design step was a large task-process680
model, which is provided in Extension 3 to the online681
version of this paper.682
4.3 Hazard Analysis Methodology of the Experiment683
The hazard analysis of the robot waiter design model684
proceeded as a set of six sessions over the April – June685
2011 period. The authors were the participating team686
for all of the sessions. The procedure adopted for the687
analysis was to use the SHARD guideword set listed688
in Section 3.1.2 and work through the Task-Process689
Model of the Robot Waiter applying the SHARD690
guidewords to the task description. Causes of any691
plausible hazards were identified as functional failures692
of the Goddard reference architecture elements that 693
were relevant to the task as defined in the Task-Process 694
Model. 695
The SHARD method was selected because it has 696
both function-oriented and interface-oriented aspects, 697
and since the functional architecture model described 698
in Section 4.2 contains elements of both types of 699
model, it was considered to be the most appropriate. 700
The SHARD guidewords shown in Table 4 were used 701
in the analysis. 702
The analysis proceeded in a typical manner for this 703
type of analysis, with the team discussing each ele- 704
ment of the model in turn and assessing the potential 705
consequences of its failure. The consequences were 706
logged in a hazard analysis table, a fragment of which 707
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is shown in Table 7. Since functional hazard analy-708
sis is very time consuming, a complete analysis (all709
keywords applied to all model elements) was not per-710
formed, only a subset sufficient to demonstrate the711
method.712
4.4 Discussion of the Results713
Table 7 provides a representative sample of the results714
that were generated in the analysis sessions. In many715
respects, this is similar to the kind of results that are716
achieved in similar analyses of non-robotic systems717
and as it stands the results show that this kind of718
analysis can yield useful safety requirements. How-719
ever, the results themselves do not reveal the issues720
that drove the research described in this paper, which721
emerged from the flow of the discussions that formed722
the process itself.723
As the analysis sessions proceeded, it became724
apparent that the analysis guide words were not direct-725
ing the team discussion in the manner intended; the726
failure conditions of individual elements of the model727
became less significant in the discussion than the iden-728
tification of the circumstances of the robot’s situation729
in its environment and the features of the environment730
with which the robot must interact. It was very diffi-731
cult to determine the exact consequences of a robot’s732
action and their severity until it is known with what733
the robot might be interacting.734
For example if a robot moves across a room at high 735
speed, either due to its control system or due to a 736
motor failure, there may be the potential for a colli- 737
sion with some object in the environment. However, 738
the precise consequences and the severity of those 739
consequences will depend on what collides with the 740
robot. If the object is a chair or a table, then the con- 741
sequence (a damaged table or chair knocked over) is 742
not particularly severe. If the object is a person, espe- 743
cially a child, then the consequences are significantly 744
higher in severity and it may be necessary to design 745
safety features into the robot to reduce the risk of this 746
occurrence. 747
During the analysis, it became clear to us that 748
the guide words being used for the analysis were 749
not encouraging the team to consider different types 750
of environmental interaction. The guide words were 751
applied to elements of the internal design of the 752
robot, albeit at an abstract level, and were effective in 753
identifying a comprehensive range of internal errors, 754
but did not assist with the identification of external 755
features with which the robot might interact in its 756
intended environment. The only external features that 757
were mentioned were those that were inherent to the 758
robot’s intended mission, which had been identified 759
in the tasks developed in the hierarchical task analy- 760
sis design process. Other features that can plausibly be 761
considered to be present at least occasionally are not 762
mentioned, and there is a very real risk that the anal- 763
ysis process may overlook potential hazards that are 764
Fig. 2 Types of interactions
for autonomous systems
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reasonably foreseeable, which may lead to accident765
risks not being reduced to acceptable levels. Further-766
more, the apparent completeness of guide word sets767
such as SHARD and HAZOP may mislead manufac-768
turers into believing that their hazard assessment is769
as complete when it is not, which could have serious770
implications for their liability and for the risk to the771
public of their products.772
The conclusions reached by the team during this773
initial trial study suggested the concept that while the774
team had specified those tasks that were required of775
the robot to perform its intended duty, there were776
potentially a lot of tasks that may be required of a777
robot simply to exist in its environment and survive778
long enough to be available to perform its intended779
tasks without causing any undesirable situations or780
unacceptable accidents.781
This revelation led us to define the concept of782
mission tasks and non-mission tasks, as illustrated in783
Fig. 2.784
Mission tasks are defined as those task required for785
the robot to fulfil its intended function or mission,786
which are typically identified by design processes787
such as hierarchical task analysis or similar methods.788
Mission tasks handle the expected interactions of the789
robot with its environment – those that are likely to790
occur in most instances of its mission.791
Non-mission tasks are those tasks other than mis-792
sion tasks that are necessary to allow a robot to ‘sur-793
vive’, i.e. to maintain its state of operational readiness794
whenever a mission is not in progress or to perform a795
task at any time that prevents the occurrence of haz- 796
ards (or reduces their risk). Non-mission tasks handle 797
the unexpected interactions – those that are reasonably 798
foreseeable but not expected to occur often. 799
The proliferation of non-mission interactions in 800
comparison to the mission interactions, which were 801
identified by the team in BRL Robot Waiter hazard 802
analysis sessions, led us to understand that the non- 803
mission tasks may well comprise the great majority of 804
the robot’s functionality or behavioural repertoire. It 805
also led to the idea that the ability to cope with non- 806
mission interactions may be a defining aspect of the 807
difference between an automatic and an autonomous 808
system. Automatic systems are designed to perform 809
mission tasks without human intervention, but do not 810
include any provision within their design for handling 811
non-mission interactions. These are handled either by 812
designing the environment of the system to exclude 813
the possibility of any interactions other than those 814
related to its mission, or else humans remain in the 815
system in a supervisory mode, handling or preventing 816
any non-mission interactions while the automatic sys- 817
tem performs the mission task(s). Industrial machines 818
and automatic (driverless) railways are good examples 819
of this concept. In contrast, autonomous systems have 820
no human control or supervisory input whatsoever, 821
and are generally expected to operate in environments 822
that have not been pre-prepared for its operation. 823
Robot waiters in cafes and wheeled rovers on other 824
planets are good examples of this concept. Thus, the 825
mission vs. non-mission task classification concept 826
Fig. 3 Comparison of
automatic and autonomous
systems
Automatic
Degree of 
Autonomy
Autonomous
• Only intended to perform mission tasks
• Operation in restricted/constrained environments that 
eliminate non-mission interactions
• No manual control
• Some manual supervision
• Operation in open unconstrained environments in 
which interactions may occur outside the intended 
mission scenarios
• No manual control or supervision
hence
• Required to perform non-mission tasks
Large jump in complexity!
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offers an intriguing insight into what the differences827
are between these classes of system.828
This relationship between the categories of auto-829
matic and autonomous systems can also be seen as830
defining a degree of autonomy measure, at least in a831
qualitative sense, as represented in Fig. 3. The more832
non-mission interactions a system is required to han-833
dle by itself without any human intervention or with-834
out prior preparation of its environment, the greater its835
degree of autonomy.836
Non-mission interactions are what makes the haz-837
ard analysis of autonomous agents (such as mobile838
robots) more difficult than conventional systems -839
it requires an additional analysis step to identify840
the non-mission interactions of an autonomous sys-841
tem as a necessary first step before proceeding to842
identify hazards derived from internal failures in the843
traditional manner. Since there may well be many844
more non-mission tasks required of a robot than mis-845
sion tasks, this additional step becomes the dominant846
design/analysis activity in the development of a robot.847
The increased effort required for the design of non-848
mission tasks will make the development process of849
the robot more expensive than an equivalent automatic850
system with manual supervision, and the determina-851
tion of the most appropriate level of automation will852
be a crucial design decision having a significant effect853
on a system’s development costs and timescales and854
its operating costs.855
Hazard analysis methods intended for identifying856
potentially hazardous non-mission interactions and857
defining safety requirements must therefore provide858
a systematic method for identifying potential haz-859
ards associated with non-mission tasks, when those860
tasks may not be defined in the robot’s functional861
requirement specification. Therefore, new methods,862
or variations on existing methods, are needed to fill863
this gap and provide a more effective method for per-864
forming preliminary hazard analysis of autonomous865
systems such as mobile robots. The method we pro-866
pose is called Environmental Survey Hazard Analysis,867
which is described in Section 5.868
5 Environmental Survey Hazard Analysis869
In this section we propose a new variant of haz-870
ard analysis, called Environmental Survey Hazard871
Analysis (ESHA), which is intended on identifying872
non-mission interactions and the potential hazards that 873
may be associated with them, as a preliminary haz- 874
ard analysis exercise that should be performed prior to 875
the more traditional internally focused hazard analysis 876
exercises that are typically performed for conventional 877
non-robotic systems [18]. 878
5.1 Objectives of New Method 879
As discussed in Section 3.1, the objective of any 880
hazard analysis method is to provide an objectively 881
demonstrable basis for demonstrating that all reason- 882
ably foreseeable hazards have been identified. This 883
must also be the objective of any method that seeks 884
to identify hazards associated with non-mission inter- 885
actions. The method must provide a classification 886
framework that can be argued as providing com- 887
plete coverage of the range of foreseeable non-mission 888
interactions at some level of abstraction, and since it 889
is not practicable to identify every instance of any 890
foreseeable interaction in any possible robotic appli- 891
cation in or operating environment, a classification 892
scheme is necessary at a higher level of abstraction, 893
which provides full coverage of the abstract model but 894
leaves it to the human analysts to supply all reasonably 895
foreseeable examples of each category for the target 896
application and environment. However, this criterion 897
in and of itself does not offer any guidance as to what 898
the hazard classification scheme should be, and there- 899
fore any such choice will be arbitrary with respect to 900
the above objective. Therefore it is necessary to draw 901
on other ideas to provide the framework. 902
Our current proposal is based on an abstract model 903
of the situated-ness of a robot in its environment. An 904
autonomous mobile robot is an agent embedded in its 905
environment, perceiving the world through its sensors 906
and taking action using its effectors (motors, manipu- 907
lators etc.) to change its state or the state of features in 908
the external environment. One way to classify features 909
of the environment, in a manner that may be conve- 910
nient to the design of safety mechanisms, could be to 911
classify them abstractly in terms of size or shape as 912
perceived by the robot through its sensors. Therefore, 913
instead of classifying hazards based on the precise 914
identity of particular features, which would lead to an 915
open-ended list, we propose to classify them in terms 916
of abstract properties that we can be certain cover all 917
possible features. 918
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Given this frame of reference, we argue that the919
entire environment perceived by the robot through its920
sensors can be divided into the following categories:921
• Environmental Features: these are features asso-922
ciated with the background environment itself,923
rather than any object situated within it, and their924
state is fixed to the frame of reference of the925
environment.926
• Objects: these are features that are embedded or927
situated within the environment, but are assigned928
their own distinct identity and state, and are often929
assigned their own frames of reference.930
We argue that everything in the environment can be931
considered either a background feature or an object,932
and thus this level of classification is complete.933
Background environmental features can be further934
sub-divided into invariant and varying features, the935
former including terrain features and the latter includ-936
ing ambient conditions. Terrain features describe fea-937
tures of the structre or configuration of the envi-938
ronment itself (i.e. not with any object situated in939
the environment) that generally remain fixed or con-940
stant during the operation of the robot. These include941
geographic areas, for example “urban”, “indoors” or942
“marine”, particular types of surface such as “paved943
road” or “grass” or terrain features such as ‘lakes’944
or ‘pathways’. Variable environmental features do945
change over time, the most common of which are946
ambient conditions, such as temperature or pressure.947
We have classified Objects by means of several948
abstract properties. One obvious abstract property of949
an object is its shape. To provide a classification that950
covers all possible shapes, we have proposed a set951
of categories based on the dimensionality of their952
shape – point-like (0D), linear (1D), surface (2D), and953
volumetric (3D). Everything in the environment that954
has a shape will fall into these categories. A second955
property we have used is motion. Objects may either956
be stationary or moving; the former may either be957
immovable (fixed in place) or may be movable, either958
by the robot itself or by the action of others. The third959
property we have used is agency, which is considered960
for moving objects, in which we consider whether an961
object is moving purposefully or not.962
In all these categorizations, we have applied wher-963
ever possible logically exclusive definitions, so that964
the hazard analysis guidewords derived from them965
cannot admit any other possibilities. This means that966
by following the guidewords human safety analysts 967
are assisted in achieving the aim of identifying all 968
reasonably foreseeable hazards, because the logical 969
structure of the classification is complete. 970
While it must be admitted that the choice of clas- 971
sification is arbitrary, it is guided heuristically by an 972
understanding of the domain problem. One of the aims 973
of this research is to assess whether the classification 974
scheme is useful in guiding human analysts towards an 975
effective identification of environmental interactions 976
and their potential hazards. If the proposed classifica- 977
tion was unhelpful in this respect, we should expect 978
to receive feedback from analysts claiming that it 979
was difficult to apply the guidewords constructively, 980
and that the guidewords hindered them from thinking 981
clearly about the problem. The discussion in Section 6 982
describes the feedback we have received so far from 983
our experiments to date. 984
Following the above argument, the ESHA classifi- 985
cation scheme is shown in Fig. 4, in which all of the 986
categories mentioned above are integrated together. 987
Environmental 
Survey
Environmental Features
Obstacles & Simple Objects
Agents
Terrain Areas
Terrain Surfaces
Terrain Features
Ambient Conditions
Other Features
Point Obstacles
Linear Obstacles
Surface Obstacles
Volumetric Obstacles
Stationary Immovable
Stationary Movable
Moving (non-agents)
Unintelligent (automatic) systems
Autonomous systems / other robots
Animals
Humans
Fig. 4 Classification scheme used in environmental survey
hazard analysis
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Table 8 EnvironmentalQ5 survey hazard analysis – standard worksheet template t8.1
t8.2Ref. No. Object: (Environment Interaction Interaction failure Interaction Consequence Safety
t8.3feature/obstacle/agent) details type/keyword failure details measures
The initial classification of environmental features988
combines the basic feature types with the complexity989
of their behaviour, dividing the complete environment990
into three possible classes:991
• Environmental features – these are invariant,992
large-scale and semi-permanent features of the993
environment that provide the reference frame994
within which other objects exist.995
• Obstacles and Simple Objects – these are objects996
that are situated within the framework of the static997
environmental features described above, which998
may be fixed, movable, or even actively mov-999
ing, but whose behaviour is not goal-directed in1000
any way, i.e. their behaviour cannot be defined as1001
purposeful in any way.1002
• Agents – these are objects that are moving in1003
the environment in a purposeful way, i.e. their1004
behaviour is goal-directed.1005
This classification of features maintains its logical1006
completeness as discussed in previous paragraphs, and1007
requires no default alternate category to do so (as is1008
done for Environmental Features, as discussed below).1009
For the Environmental Features category, we have1010
defined the following principal sub-categories: terrain1011
surface types, terrain areas, terrain features, and ambi-1012
ent conditions. The argument is that the robot will1013
perceive the world as one or more different areas, each1014
of which has a given type of surface and contains a set1015
of terrain features and ambient conditions. Since this1016
classification scheme is not logically closed, we must1017
admit to the possibility of other types of environment1018
feature that do not fall into the secondary scheme;1019
therefore we have added a default secondary category1020
that covers all features not covered by the first four.1021
This closes the logical completeness of this level of the1022
classification, and although it does not provide posi-1023
tive guidance to analysts it will at least remind them1024
that they must consider other possibilities and encour-1025
ages analysts to search for any exceptional features1026
that are not covered by the initial classification.1027
For the Obstacles and Simple Objects category,1028
we have defined four shape/structure categories that1029
reflect how these features may be perceived by a1030
robot: Point Obstacles (0-D), Linear Obstacles (1-D),1031
Surface Obstacles (2-D) and Volumetric Obstacles (3- 1032
D). We argue that all objects in the environment will 1033
be perceived by the robot as having a shape or struc- 1034
ture that is point-like, line-like, surface-like or will 1035
have a perceived volume. Therefore, by encourag- 1036
ing analysts to search for features that have these 1037
shape characteristics, we argue that they will search 1038
through all reasonably foreseeable features within the 1039
target environment. Since this is a logically closed 1040
classification it does not require any default cate- 1041
gory called “other types” or similar. We have also 1042
further sub-divided the volumetric obstacles into a fur- 1043
ther sub-category based on whether its movement can 1044
be influenced by the actions of the robot: Stationary 1045
Immovable (i.e. obstacles that cannot be pushed out 1046
of the way), Stationary Movable (obstacles that can 1047
be pushed out of the way by the robot or due to other 1048
actions) and Moving (obstacles that do move, but not 1049
in any purposeful way i.e. they are not agents). 1050
For the Agents category, we have defined four cate- 1051
gories that capture the full range of behaviour patterns 1052
that any agent may exhibit, which is perceived by the 1053
robot. The secondary categories are: Automatic Sys- 1054
tems (performing mission tasks only), Autonomous 1055
Systems and Other Robots (which perform both mis- 1056
sion and non-mission tasks), Animals (autonomous 1057
biological creatures exhibiting purposeful but non- 1058
sentient behaviour) and Humans (autonomous bio- 1059
logical creatures exhibiting purposeful and sentient 1060
behaviour).1 1061
These classification categories are being tested in 1062
on-going design studies and trials at Bristol Robotics 1063
Laboratory, the first tranche of which are reported 1064
in Section 6 of this paper. It is anticipated that the 1065
classification scheme and the associated guide words 1066
(see Section 5.2) will evolve over time depending on 1067
how useful they are in guiding analysts in the sys- 1068
tematic identification of non-mission interactions and 1069
tasks. As discussed in Section 7, it is anticipated that 1070
1Until the existence of other sentient species is proved, we
consider humans to be the only category of autonomous biolog-
ical creatures exhibiting purposeful and sentient behaviour, and
hence no other species need be named in this category. The sub-
categories of agents are only developed for the purposes of our
classification and have no authority for any other purpose.
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the classification scheme may evolve significantly as1071
different classes of robotic applications are studied or1072
developed.1073
5.2 Procedure of New Method1074
For the trials described in Section 6, we developed a1075
set of aids for performing an ESHA analysis:1076
1. An ESHA Procedure Checklist, which contains1077
the classification categories mentioned in Section1078
5.1 above, and provide non-exhaustive lists of1079
examples as an aid to the analyst(s). The check-1080
list contains a number of questions designed to1081
guide the analyst(s) in thinking through the appli-1082
cation of the ESHA classification guide words as1083
shown in Fig. 4. The checklist is provided in the1084
text boxes on the following three pages.1085
2. A generic ESHA worksheet (shown in Tables 81086
and 9) which provides a tabular format for record-
Q6
1087
ing the results of the analysis. It is similar in1088
layout to Table 1, but the column titles are aligned1089
to the output of the ESHA procedure information.1090
The full worksheet template and checklist have also1091
been provided as Extensions 4 and 5 to the online1092
version of this paper.1093
The Procedure Checklist consists of three parts,1094
for Environmental Features, Obstacles and Simple1095
Objects, and Agents. Each part comprises a series of1096
steps, characterised by questions, in which the classi-1097
fication scheme mentioned previously in this section1098
is applied to identify potential environmental interac-1099
tions (mission and non-mission related), and then to1100
determine whether the interactions have potential haz-1101
ards and to identify possible safety measures that may1102
reduce or eliminate the risk of those hazards. These1103
safety measures would then become system safety1104
requirements for the robot, to be incorporated into its1105
design.1106
The standard Worksheet Template is matched to1107
the Procedure Checklist, and is intended to provide a1108
tabular format for recording the results of the assess-1109
ments and decisions of the hazard analysis process, so1110
that they can be reviewed afterwards for the purposes1111
of safety assurance, or to repeat/revise the results if1112
necessary.1113
The checklist and worksheet template have been1114
applied in some (but not all) of the experiments1115
conducted to date, and the assessment of that work is1116
discussed in Sections 6 and 7.1117 Ta
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6 Trials of Environmental Survey Hazard Analysis1122
Having developed the initial ESHA method proposal,1123
which we believe offers an improved assessment of1124
mobile autonomous robot applications, we set out to1125
evaluate the new method on further robotic applica-1126
tion studies. This section provides an overview of the1127
results collected.1128
By fortunate coincidence, at the time the proposed1129
ESHA method was being developed, the INTRO1130
project was in the process of developing the initial1131
requirements and specifications for its demonstrator1132
projects. This offered an opportunity to test the new1133
method on the demonstrator, and at a workshop at1134
BRL in 2011 we held two sessions in which we used1135
Environmental Surveys to identify conceptual haz-1136
ards that might be associated with the application1137
requirements that the INTRO project was developing1138
as design studies for the two demonstrator projects.1139
In addition to the INTRO demonstrator projects,1140
two Postgraduate (MSc) Dissertation studies were per-1141
formed in 2012 into safety analysis and design of1142
robotic applications. One project (the USAR Robot1143
study) was a precursor to further work to be done1144
within the INTRO project, while the other (the Guide1145
Assistant Robot) was developed as an entirely inde-1146
pendent study.1147
Section 6.1 provides the description of the appli-1148
cation of ESHA to the Robot Waiter scenario.1149
Section 6.2 reviews the work done on the Urban1150
Search and Rescue (USAR) application study, and1151
finally Section 6.3 reviews the study into a Guide1152
Assistant Robot application. Each section discusses1153
the task requirements of the application, the (partial)1154
ESHA exercises that were performed and presents the1155
results that were obtained.1156
6.1 Application Study #1 – The Robot Waiter1157
The Robot Waiter scenario described in chapter 41158
aims to demonstrate the behaviour of an intelligent1159
robotic system that functions in close interaction with1160
humans in a cafe, which is a partially unstructured and1161
dynamically changing environment.1162
In this scenario, characteristics such as autonomy,1163
an intelligent interface, high-level sensing abilities,1164
a safe manipulator arm, visual pattern recognition1165
and knowledge extraction in order to learn about the1166
robot’s environment, are key to achieve an efficient 1167
human-robot interaction and cooperation. 1168
During the September 2011 INTRO Workshop, 1169
held at Bristol Robotics Laboratory (BRL), a trial 1170
of Environmental Survey Hazard Analysis (ESHA) 1171
was conducted for the first time with participants 1172
other than the authors. The general aim of the overall 1173
process is to merge the results of ESHA with the afore- 1174
mentioned Hazard Analysis results. The traditional 1175
Hazard Analysis would take care of the potential 1176
hazards in mission tasks caused during a system’s 1177
operation in its environment, while the Environmen- 1178
tal Survey would identify the non-mission aspects of 1179
extended operation. 1180
In the practice session, a four-person group applied 1181
an especially drafted form for ESHA. After the tuto- 1182
rial a discussion session was conducted in order to 1183
collect the participants’ opinions on the usefulness of 1184
the approach. The practice session lasted less than 2 1185
hours, so the quantity of work achieved was small, but 1186
enough to offer an initial impression of the approach. 1187
A sample from the ESHA worksheet produced by this 1188
study group is shown in Tables 8 and 9. Q71189
The Robot Waiter scenario was the same as the one 1190
described in chapter 4, however, the way the same 1191
scenario was approached this time is different since 1192
in chapter 4, only the mission tasks were considered, 1193
as it happens for a traditional Hazard Analysis, while 1194
during these trials the new ESHA was applied to the 1195
Robot Waiter scenario, thus all non-mission aspects 1196
and the environment where the robot operates were 1197
taken into account. 1198
The analysis was effective since participants were 1199
able to go over multiple possible hazard scenarios 1200
involving the robot and environmental elements. The 1201
safety requirements identified for both the robot and 1202
the environment were numerous, and it was clear that 1203
many more could have been made during a longer 1204
trial. 1205
However, the participants commented that better 1206
guidance is needed in the order to ensure that each 1207
row of the hazard analysis table must be filled. The 1208
possible resulting confusion increases the chance that 1209
parts of the analysis may be overlooked. During the 1210
trial, in order to complete the survey, guidance from 1211
the authors was necessary. In addition, the “Interaction 1212
Failure Details” column in the ESHA form was not 1213
taken in consideration by the participants, who would 1214
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find that field hard to fill. Furthermore, it was neces-1215
sary to explain that the “Interaction Details” column1216
refers to normal operational times. These comments1217
will be considered as the guidelines for a future revi-1218
sion of the ESHA methodology (see Section 7.2).1219
6.2 Application Study #2 – Urban Search and Rescue1220
Application1221
In the USAR scenario, the aim is to detect and1222
uncover surface and lightly trapped victims. “Sur-1223
face” victims are visible and mostly free to move and1224
“Lightly” trapped ones are partially covered by light1225
and small pieces of rubble. The first phase of rescue1226
response, after setting coordinating command centre1227
up, is reconnaissance of affected region to identify1228
cold, warm and hot zone. The INTRO USAR scenario1229
considers human robot collaboration in this phase.1230
Using rescue robots in this phase helps to speed up the1231
search for victim and reduces risks that the human res-1232
cuers are exposed to. Additionally, robots can assist1233
in uncovering lightly trapped victims. The search for1234
victims is shared between a human rescuer and an1235
assistant mobile robot. The robot will cooperate with1236
the human in assisting both with the visual detection1237
and the extraction of victims by clearing away the1238
rubble which is trapping them.1239
The robotic system will include a mobile platform1240
fit for unstructured environments and a standard 61241
degree of freedom manipulator. In the USAR sce-1242
nario, a mobile robot assistant has three main require-1243
ments: mobility, manipulation and sensing. Mobility1244
is ensured by the mobile outdoor platform base which1245
is also capable of powering the auxiliary hardware1246
installed on it. Simple manipulation tasks such as pick1247
and place of small and light objects are provided by1248
the manipulator. The sensors positioned on the base1249
include rangers for navigation so that the human-robot1250
team can navigate the ruins in search of victims to1251
extract. A stereo vision camera is also employed for1252
HRI and victim detection.1253
6.2.1 Application Specification1254
The scenario comprises multiple tasks. The robot1255
searches the disaster environment controlled by tele-1256
operation. During exploration, visual saliency detec-1257
tion is continuously employed to look for victims’1258
faces and/or movement. In case of a successful detec- 1259
tion, the robotic manipulator is pointed in the direction 1260
of the victim to inform the rescue worker of the vic- 1261
tim’s approximate position. At this point, the follow- 1262
ing robot action depends on the intention recognition 1263
cues. Depending on the rescuer’s cue, the robot has 1264
two possible behaviours. In the case where the res- 1265
cue worker picks up a piece of rubble and offers it 1266
to the robot, the rescuer is indicating to the robot that 1267
it must pick up the rubble and deposit it to a suit- 1268
able place. Then, the robot will get ready to pick up 1269
another piece. The robot acts autonomously during 1270
this collaboration. 1271
On the contrary, if the human directs the robot with 1272
a pointing gesture then the robot independently begins 1273
clearing out an area of the rubble. At this point, the 1274
robot continues moving the rubble until the victim is 1275
free. The robot continues finding and extracting vic- 1276
tims until the end of the mission. The state-chart of 1277
this scenario is depicted in the Fig. 5. 1278
6.2.2 Results of SAR Robot Hazard Analysis 1279
At the September 2011 INTRO workshop at BRL a 1280
tutorial session on ESHA was held, to introduce the 1281
INTRO project researchers to the proposed method 1282
and to conduct an initial trial that would provide feed- 1283
back on the usability of the technique. It must be noted 1284
that this workshop took place early in the demonstra- 1285
tor project, and the analysis was not performed on the 1286
design model illustrated in Fig. 5, which represents a 1287
later stage of development. The ESHA worksheet that 1288
was developed for the USAR Robot demonstrator in 1289
the workshop tutorial is presented in Table 10 and its 1290
accompanying notes. 1291
Since the session was a tutorial and the first time 1292
that the participants had received any training in 1293
hazard analysis, the study group that produced the 1294
worksheet did not develop the worksheet precisely as 1295
intended in the checklist procedure. Improvement of 1296
the checklist guidelines has been identified as an area 1297
for further development (see Section 7.1). However, 1298
the general feedback from the participants was that the 1299
method encouraged them to consider issues that they 1300
might not have done before, and the worksheet and its 1301
notes show that in the limited time available the study 1302
group was beginning to identify aspects of the robot’s 1303
interaction with its environment and the consequent 1304
non-mission interactions. 1305
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Fig. 5 USAR robot task model
6.3 Application Study #3 – Guide Assistant Robot1306
Application1307
The third application study of ESHA was an MSc dis-1308
sertation project carried out by one of the authors at1309
BRL in 2012 [7]. The dissertation was a study on the1310
requirements of a guide robot for elderly persons, in1311
which a task analysis was performed to identify the1312
mission tasks required of the robot, and the ESHA1313
technique was used to identify robot hazards and the1314
safety requirements and non-mission tasks necessary1315
to mitigate their risks.1316
6.3.1 Application Specification 1317
The basic functional requirement of the Guide Robot 1318
was developed as a task model using Hierarchical Task 1319
Analysis as the requirements capture method. This 1320
produced the task diagram shown in Fig. 6, which is 1321
presented in tabular form in Table 11. 1322
The Guide Robot’s complete functionality is 1323
described by its top level Task 0 “Guide the elderly 1324
to the destination”. The robot performs this task by 1325
means of four sub-tasks: “Waiting for user’s call”, 1326
“Getting user’s requirement”, “Escorting the user to 1327
the destination” and “Finishing the journey”. Further 1328
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Table 10 Environmental Q8survey hazard analysis worksheet – INTRO project 3rd workshop tutorial – USAR robot example t10.1
t10.2Object: Interaction Interaction failure Interaction Consequence Safety measures
t10.3(Environment details type/keyword failure details
t10.4feature/obstacle
t10.5/agent)
t10.6Burning rooms Approach Failure to interact Don’t find the fire Injury Inherent –
t10.7Damage to robot temperature
t10.8measurement
t10.9Too little interaction Don’t move Injury Inherent –make
t10.10close enough robot fire proof
t10.11Injury User training
t10.12Too much Moves into fire Damage to robot
t10.13interaction
t10.14Detect fire Fails to detect Injury
t10.15Failure to interact a fire Damage to robot
t10.16Fails to warn fire
t10.17-fighters
t10.18Detect people
t10.19Notify/warn
t10.20Edge to Avoid Failure to interact Drives over drop Injury to people below Terrain scanning
t10.21vertical drop the drop Sensors mounted
t10.22Damage to robot high up on
t10.23the robot
t10.24Diverse scanning
t10.25with sonar,
t10.26vision, laser,
t10.27sound, etc.
t10.28Inherent: hooks
t10.29on the back of the
t10.30robot that can
t10.31grab the surface
t10.32and avoid a fall
t10.33Inherent: Explosive
t10.34bolt at the back
t10.35that secures the robot
t10.36and avoids a fall
t10.37Inherent: Long
t10.38robot with large
t10.39mass in the
t10.40centre to avoid it
t10.41from falling even
t10.42if it passes over
t10.43an edge
JrnlID 10846 ArtID 0020 Proof#1 - 30/01/2014
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D P
RO
OF
J Intell Robot Syst
Table 10 (continued)
t10.2Object: Interaction Interaction failure Interaction Consequence Safety measures
t10.3(Environment details type/keyword failure details
t10.4feature/obstacle
t10.5/agent)
Circumstances t10.6
Collapsed building meaning that path planning from old drawings isn’t possible t10.7
Wheeled robot with single manipulator t10.8
Fire in the building t10.9
There is a human present to cooperate with the robot t10.10
The robot can lift approximately 7 kg t10.11
The robot can push things t10.12
The robot can do reconnaissance t10.13
Analysis of environmental features t10.14
Specific areas t10.15
Interior: rooms (possibly broken), corridor (possibly broken), stairs (possibly broken), rubble t10.16
Exterior: rubble, streets, garden, t10.17
Types of terrain surface t10.18
Floor, stairs, rubble t10.19
Types of terrain features t10.20
Rough, damaged, uneven, cracks, water, mud, gravel t10.21
Ambient conditions t10.22
Daylight outside and dark inside, sharp contrasts, any kind of light, outside temperature, smoke and fire t10.23
Analysis of obstacles and simple objects t10.24
Point-like obstacles t10.25
Fire, exposed electrical cable t10.26
Linear obstacles t10.27
Stairs, edge to a vertical drop, cables, cracks in the floor t10.28
Surface obstacles t10.29
Collapsed flat objects t10.30
subdivisions of these tasks are described in Table 11.1329
The task analysis only considered essential sub-tasks1330
to achieve top level task and assumed some of the1331
potential error situations that may occur in performing1332
this scenario.1333
The nominal mission of the Guide Robot is as fol-1334
lows: the robot is intended to remain stationary at1335
a pre-determined standby location, and continuously1336
scan for calls from prospective users of the robot, and1337
when a call is detected or received to go to that user.1338
Once called by a given user, the robot will not be able1339
to accept any other call until the conditions arise where1340
the mission is complete. By returning to a standby1341
location, the robot ensures that it does not block the1342
environment by waiting at the location where its last1343
mission ended. User interactions such as asking a 1344
question or getting a user’s request are intended to be 1345
done by means of a touch screen, or by gesture or 1346
speech recognition. 1347
It is assumed that the robot has a built in map 1348
of the operating environment (a care home for the 1349
elderly) which provides pre-planned paths for given 1350
destinations, allowing the robot to plan a journey auto- 1351
matically after confirming the destination from the 1352
user. 1353
Escorting and guiding a user to a destination 1354
requires the robot to move carefully so as to maintain 1355
pace with the user, who may well not be able to move 1356
fast, and particular stages of the journey (especially at 1357
the start and end) may require the robot to announce 1358
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Fig. 6 Guide robot hierarchical task diagram
its intentions so that the user is not confused about the1359
robot’s intended behaviour. It is intended that the user1360
places a hand on top of the robot while moving so that1361
the robot can use touch/pressure sensors to detect that1362
it is in pace with the user or when the user leaves the1363
robot (intentionally or unintentionally). As the robot1364
moves it guides the user around obstacles as well as1365
following the planned path.1366
6.3.2 Results of PC Robot Hazard Analysis1367
Having completed a basic task specification using1368
HTA, the design was subjected to a preliminary haz-1369
ard identification analysis using the ESHA technique.1370
However it should be noted that for reasons of practi-1371
cality this list was developed by the research student as1372
a ‘brainstorming’ exercise, not by conducting a phys-1373
ical on-site survey of a care home. Therefore, while it1374
was sufficient to develop design and simulation mod-1375
els for the purposes of a student dissertation, it should1376
not be seen as sufficiently or reasonably foreseeably1377
complete for the purposes of a commercial product1378
without being supported by such a direct survey of a1379
target environment. However, the exercise was suffi- 1380
cient to allow an initial overview of the practicability 1381
of the ESHA method. 1382
Following the guidelines described in Section 5, 1383
a list of Environmental Features, Obstacles/Simple 1384
Objects, and Agents to be found in a care home was 1385
drawn up by the research student. This list is shown
Q9
1386
in Table 12. Some of the items in the list were used 1387
to develop a set of ESHA worksheets, in which the 1388
potentially harmful interactions with those items were 1389
identified and a set of safety measures were identified 1390
that could reduce their risk (i.e. reduce their severity 1391
or probability). A sample of these worksheets is pro- 1392
vided in Table 13, and the full set that was developed 1393
in the MSc Dissertation is included in an Extension 6 1394
to this paper. 1395
The safety measures in Table 13 and the ESHA 1396
worksheets were classified into Inherent safety mea- 1397
sures, Safeguards and protective mechanisms, and 1398
Instructions to users. This is consistent with the 1399
practice of the risk reduction methodologies underly- 1400
ing international standards for industrial and service 1401
robots (ISO 10218 [22]). Inherent safety measures are 1402
passive constraints or built-in properties of the robot 1403
JrnlID 10846 ArtID 0020 Proof#1 - 30/01/2014
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D P
RO
OF
J Intell Robot Syst
Ta
bl
e
11
G
ui
de
ro
bo
tt
as
k
de
sc
rip
tio
n
s
t1
1.
1
t1
1.
2
Ta
sk
n
am
e
Ta
sk
de
sc
rip
tio
n
Ta
sk
pl
an
(S
)
t1
1.
3
0
G
u
id
e
th
e
el
de
rly
to
th
e
de
st
in
at
io
n
PL
A
N
0:
t1
1.
4
•N
or
m
al
se
qu
en
ce
:1
-2
-3
-4
t1
1.
5

1
W
ai
tf
o
r
u
se
r’
s
ca
ll
R
em
ai
n
st
at
io
n
ar
y
an
d
lo
o
k
fo
r
a
u
se
r’
s
ca
ll
PL
A
N
1:
t1
1.
6

1.
1
G
o
to
st
an
db
y
lo
ca
tio
n

G
o
to
st
an
db
y
lo
ca
tio
n
an
d
w
ai
tt
he
re
•N
or
m
al
se
qu
en
ce
:1
.1
-1
.2
-1
.3
t1
1.
7

1.
2
R
ea
d
th
e
u
se
r’
s
ca
ll

Re
ce
iv
e
an
d
m
at
ch
sig
na
lo
r
sig
n
fro
m
u
se
r
(sp
ee
ch
o
r
bu
tto
n
to
ca
ll
ro
bo
t)
t1
1.
8

1.
3
M
o
v
e
to
th
e
u
se
r

A
pp
ro
ac
h
u
se
r
cl
o
se
en
o
u
gh
to
ge
tu
se
r’
s
re
qu
es
tw
ith
in
sa
fe
ty
di
st
an
ce
t1
1.
9

2
G
et
th
e
u
se
r’
s
re
qu
ire
m
en
t
O
bt
ai
n
an
o
rd
er
fo
r
th
e
de
st
in
at
io
n
o
fu
se
r
PL
A
N
2:
t1
1.
10

2.
1
A
sk
th
e
de
st
in
at
io
n

In
te
ra
ct
w
ith
u
se
r
to
o
bt
ai
n
u
se
r’
s
re
qu
ire
m
en
t
•N
or
m
al
se
qu
en
ce
:2
.1
-2
.2
t1
1.
11

2.
2
R
ea
d
th
e
u
se
r’
s
co
m
m
an
d

Re
ce
iv
e
an
d
co
n
fir
m
th
e
de
sti
n
at
io
n
fro
m
u
se
r
in
te
rfa
ce
o
r
sp
ee
ch
t1
1.
12

3
Es
co
rt
th
e
u
se
r
to
th
e
de
st
in
at
io
n
G
u
id
e
u
se
r
u
n
til
re
ac
hi
n
g
th
e
de
sti
n
at
io
n
PL
A
N
3:
t1
1.
13

3.
1
W
ai
tf
o
r
st
ar
tin
g
co
m
m
an
d

lo
o
k
fo
r
u
se
r’
s
st
ar
tin
g
co
m
m
an
d
(sp
ee
ch
an
d
to
u
ch
o
n
to
p
o
fr
o
bo
t)
•N
or
m
al
se
qu
en
ce
:
t1
1.
14

3.
2
A
n
n
o
u
n
ce
th
e
jou
rn
ey

N
ot
ic
e
th
e
jou
rn
ey
to
u
se
r
u
sin
g
v
o
ic
e
©
3.
1,
3.
2,
3.
3,
3.
4
t1
1.
15

3.
3
St
ar
tt
o
m
o
v
e

St
ar
tt
o
m
o
v
e
w
ith
u
se
r
©
3.
5
ex
ec
u
te
s
in
pa
ra
lle
lt
o
n
o
rm
al
se
qu
en
ce
t1
1.
16

3.
4
M
o
v
e
to
th
e
de
st
in
at
io
n

G
o
to
th
e
de
st
in
at
io
n
w
ith
u
se
r
PL
A
N
3.
4:
t1
1.
17

3.
4.
1
Sc
an
th
e
pl
an
n
ed
pa
th

Sc
an
th
e
pl
an
n
ed
pa
th
•N
or
m
al
se
qu
en
ce
:
t1
1.
18

3.
4.
2
D
et
ec
ti
rr
em
o
v
ab
le
o
bs
ta
cl
e

In
te
ra
ct
w
ith
en
v
iro
n
m
en
tt
o
fin
d
irr
em
o
v
ab
le
o
bs
ta
cl
e
w
ith
in
ra
n
ge
o
fs
en
so
r
©
3.
4.
1,
3.
4.
2,
3.
4.
3,
3.
4.
4
t1
1.
19

3.
4.
3
Id
en
tif
y
th
e
rig
ht
pa
th

Co
nf
irm
th
e
rig
ht
pa
th
©
3.
4.
5
ex
ec
u
te
s
in
pa
ra
lle
lt
o
n
o
rm
al
se
qu
en
ce
t1
1.
20

3.
4.
4
Fo
llo
w
th
e
pa
th

M
o
v
e
al
o
n
g
th
e
rig
ht
pa
th
t1
1.
21

3.
4.
5
Ch
ec
k
th
e
u
se
r’
s
fo
llo
w
in
g

M
o
n
ito
r
u
se
r’
s
fo
llo
w
in
g
du
rin
g
th
e
jou
rn
ey
u
sin
g
to
u
ch
se
n
so
r
t1
1.
22

3.
5
M
ai
n
ta
in
th
e
di
st
an
ce
w
ith
u
se
r

M
o
v
e
w
ith
es
tim
at
ed
w
al
ki
n
g
sp
ee
d
o
fu
se
r
t1
1.
23

4
Fi
n
ish
th
e
jou
rn
ey
Fi
n
ish
th
e
jou
rn
ey
if
ro
bo
ta
rr
iv
e
th
e
de
st
in
at
io
n
PL
A
N
4:
t1
1.
24

4.
1
A
n
n
o
u
n
ce
th
e
en
d
o
fjo
u
rn
ey

A
nn
ou
nc
e
th
e
en
d
o
fjo
u
rn
ey
to
u
se
r
to
re
co
gn
iz
e
th
e
de
st
in
at
io
n
•N
or
m
al
se
qu
en
ce
:4
.1
-4
.2
t1
1.
25

4.
2
St
o
p
m
o
v
in
g

St
o
p
m
o
v
in
g
slo
w
ly
in
o
rd
er
to
al
lo
w
u
se
r
th
at
is
ab
le
to
st
o
p
th
ei
r
fo
llo
w
in
g
JrnlID 10846 ArtID 0020 Proof#1 - 30/01/2014
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D P
RO
OF
J Intell Robot Syst
Table 12 Examples of environment features
Environment feature
Specific areas Bedroom, Bathroom, Living room, Care home common room, Kitchen,
Storage room, Corridors, Lifts/Elevators, Staircase
Terrain surfaces Carpeted surface, Smooth/polished tile floor, Wooden flooring
(smooth, varnished)
Terrain features Walls, Doors (sliding door, normal door, automatic doors, rolling shutter,
saloon doors), Windows (full height windows only), Mirrors
(full-height mirror, smaller mirrors)
Ambient conditions Natural light conditions, Artificial light conditions (approximate sunlight
(broad spectrum of colours), monochromatic light), Directed / diffuse light
source, Air temperature (Room temperature(≈ 20C), Hot conditions (≥ 40C),
Cold conditions (≈ 5C)), Water/moisture conditions (Fire sprinklers, Fluids
spilt on robot (e.g. drinks), Water on floor, Humidity), Wind / air currents
(e.g. through open window), Leaking gas, Salt atmosphere (near coasts)
Environment obstacles and simple objects
Point obstacles Media Centre / Speakers, Lights & Lamps, Cookers (chemical/odour source),
Vacuum cleaners (noise source), Washing machines (noise source)
Linear obstacles Floor surface area edges (carpet edges, tile floor edges), Vertical furniture
items (lamps, potted plants, loudspeakers, coat stands, ceramic vases), Cables
for portable appliances, Doorsteps or small steps, Edges
of staircases, Edges of holes
Surface obstacles Pictures & ornaments on walls, Television screens, Water spilt on the floor,
Spilt beads/marbles/balls on floor, Detergent (or other slippery surface) on
floor, Thick/soft carpets (which are hard to drive over), Recently cleaned
surfaces marked by signs, Manholes & trapdoors, Food spilt on floor, Clutter
on floor (papers, plastic bags, other objects left on the floor)
Volumetric obstacles Large furniture (large tables, heavy chairs, bookcases, shelves, other large
furniture items, appliances, beds, sofas), Portable items (walking sticks, clutter
on the floor), Smaller chairs/tables, Wheeled objects (wheelchairs, trolleys,
suitcases, appliances, items mounted on wheeled stands), Movable
signs/barriers, Balls/toys, Trolleys/stretchers, Moving decorations, Moving
ventilation fans, Waste bins, Things falling off tables
Agents
Customer User (attention level, native language, vision, hearing impairment, balance,
speech impairment, gesture/manipulation impairment (i.e. can’t keep steady
hand on top of the robot), walking speed)
Animals Pets (cats, dogs, birds, rabbits, guide dogs, exotic animals)
Humans Other people:care home residents (with varying attention level, native
language, vision/hearing impairment, walking speed, position: seated/lying
down/standing-), cleaners, visitors, care workers, security, supervisors,
medical personnel (walking/running speed, attention level), people in
wheelchairs, people on stretchers, children ((in-)attention level,
walking/running speed, size, position: seated/lying down/standing,
non-malicious but deliberate misuse (i.e. playing with the robot)
Autonomous systems or Other robots: cleaning robots, other guide robots, robot pets (entertainment
unintelligent systems robots), mobile domestic servant robots, medical robots, semi-autonomous
wheelchairs
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that ensure that an environmental interaction does not1404
cause harm, such as limitation of motor power or use1405
of soft materials. Safeguards and protection mech-1406
anisms are active functions of the robot that take1407
positive action to prevent hazards occurring, for exam-1408
ple speed controllers for robot wheelbases or force1409
controller for manipulators. Instructions in the user1410
manuals and guidance notes for users are sometimes1411
required as safety measures when no inherent or safe-1412
guard measure can be provided, warning the user to1413
take certain actions in order to avoid possible hazards,1414
for example warnings about when to apply the emer-1415
gency stop button. Table 13 shows how ESHA can be1416
used to develop safety requirements in a manner con-1417
sistent with those already found in industry standards.1418
We consider this to be useful in assisting the produc-1419
tion of coherent safety requirements specifications for1420
robots.1421
Although only a partial set of ESHA worksheets1422
were developed in this MSc study, they provide a clear1423
illustration of how the method is to be applied, and1424
these results are currently the most extensive appli-1425
cation of the method to date. The results do show1426
the derivation of safety requirements from a system-1427
atic review of environmental interactions regardless of1428
their status as mission or non-mission tasks. There-1429
fore, while details such as the ESHA keyword sets1430
may continue to evolve in the future to improve their1431
applicability and coverage, it is clear that an analy-1432
sis process of this format is able to fulfil the objective1433
of providing a non-mission based perspective on the1434
behaviour of a robot.1435
The main limitation of this study was the fact that1436
it was the work of a single student and not a design1437
team including domain experts, which is the recom-1438
mended practice in industry for conducting for system1439
hazard analyses and remains equally valid for ESHA1440
(although several analysis sessions were conducted1441
with a group of student colleagues and supervisors).1442
This limitation can be seen in a close inspection of the1443
ESHA worksheets, where some of the entries appear1444
to be based on assumptions that a domain expert might1445
challenge. However, this limitation was inherent in1446
the structure of the project. The issue of provision of1447
domain expertise is discussed further in Section 7.1.1448
7 Discussion 1449
In this section we discuss the themes emerging from 1450
all the application studies taken as a complete set, i.e. 1451
comments on the effectiveness of the ESHA method- 1452
ology. 1453
7.1 Findings from the INTRO & BRL Experiments 1454
The tutorial session on hazard analysis, which was 1455
held at the 3rd INTRO project Workshop at BRL in 1456
2011, was the first trial of the ESHA method. Details 1457
of the results of the tutorial are provided in Sections 1458
6.1 and 6.2. There were two specific comments aris- 1459
ing from this first trial of the ESHA method, which 1460
will be taken into consideration when refining the 1461
methodology in the future: 1462
1. Although the intent of ESHA is that the hazard 1463
analysis process should not be biased by the mis- 1464
sion specification, in practice it is still necessary 1465
to provide some contextual information on what 1466
general tasks the autonomous system is expected 1467
to be doing, if only to allow the relevant envi- 1468
ronmental situations to be identified in which 1469
non-mission interactions might occur. Therefore, 1470
it is still necessary to consider the mission in 1471
terms of its generalized scenarios as background 1472
information to the analysis. 1473
2. Better guidance is needed on the order in which 1474
the tables should be completed. The guidelines 1475
were insufficiently clear about the need to ensure 1476
that each row of the hazard analysis table is com- 1477
plete before moving on to the next one. As a 1478
result, one of the sessions became a little chaotic 1479
in the way in which the table was completed, and 1480
it was noted that this increased the possibility that 1481
parts of the analysis may be overlooked. The com- 1482
ment was raised that the wording of the guidelines 1483
should be revised to make the procedure more pre- 1484
scriptive in the way in which the analysis steps 1485
were to be followed. This will be considered as 1486
the guidelines are revised in the light of further 1487
practice and experience. 1488
The Guide Robot and the design study was the second 1489
phase of trials of the ESHA method, by which time 1490
more experience in applying the methods had been 1491
gained. This study showed that the general method 1492
appears to be feasible, although the major lesson 1493
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learned at this stage was that like other more estab-1494
lished variants of hazard analysis, ESHA requires a1495
team with good domain knowledge in order to produce1496
an analysis with good confidence that all reasonably1497
foreseeable hazards have been identified. While the1498
analysis of the Guide Robot could proceed because1499
this type of robot is operated in domestic environ-1500
ments, for which most people have good domain1501
experience by default, this issue was a particular prob-1502
lem with some of the work on the USAR Robot1503
problem, where there was difficulty in applying the1504
ESHA method because none of the researchers or1505
supervisors had sufficient experience with search and1506
rescue operations to form a confident opinion about1507
the identification of hazards.1508
7.2 Improvements to Environmental Survey Hazard1509
Analysis1510
Given the experience of the trials described in1511
Section 6 and the conclusions presented in Section 7.1,1512
we consider the following improvements of the ESHA1513
to be needed for1514
• Refinements to the ESHA guidewords, to offer1515
more usable guidance.1516
• Refinements to the ESHA checklist/procedure, to1517
clarify how the ESHA worksheet tables should be1518
completed and the order in which the work should1519
be done.1520
• Development of further guidance on the composi-1521
tion of the analysis team and the need for persons1522
with suitable domain knowledge or experience to1523
participate in the process.1524
8 Conclusions1525
In this section, we discuss some of the wider issues1526
raised by this research.1527
8.1 Implications for Industry Safety Standards1528
in the Robotics Sector1529
Once this work gains maturity and is more widely1530
practised and accepted, it may form a valuable tool1531
complementing the use of robotics industry safety1532
standards. We hope that the general principle can1533
be written into future versions of standards such as1534
ISO 13482 that the preliminary hazard analysis stage 1535
of any robot development project should include an 1536
environmental assessment intended to identify non- 1537
mission interactions. 1538
8.2 Requirements for Online Hazard Analysis 1539
in Advanced Robots 1540
Although we believe ESHA to provide a useful basis 1541
for preliminary hazard analysis by human designers of 1542
robots, there are limits to what can be achieved dur- 1543
ing the design stage. We believe the method will be 1544
able to support the claim that human designers have 1545
taken all reasonably foreseeable steps to identify haz- 1546
ards for relatively simple robots, which perform only 1547
a few tasks in environments that are predictable in 1548
advance of the robot’s entry into service (such as the 1549
initial generation of robots anticipated in the devel- 1550
opment of the industry safety standard ISO 13482). 1551
However, as the number of required mission tasks and 1552
the required number of operating environments grows, 1553
the number of potential non-mission interactions will 1554
grow rapidly, making the task of identifying all such 1555
interactions by hand prohibitively expensive, and for 1556
more sophisticated robots designers will not credibly 1557
be able to make the above claims. 1558
Although an ESHA-style preliminary hazard anal- 1559
ysis will still be a useful tool in specifying safety func- 1560
tions for an initial set of non-mission interactions, a 1561
truly dependable robot will need to be capable of iden- 1562
tifying new environmental features online and devel- 1563
oping the relevant safety functions to maintain safety 1564
in the new non-mission interactions. This may well 1565
entail the use of adaptive and learning mechanisms 1566
configured to the identification of novel environmen- 1567
tal features, and for the provision of behavioural 1568
capabilities for investigating such features and for 1569
assessing the safety of the resultant interactions. 1570
Novelty detection and task acquisition is an on- 1571
going field of research in robotics, for example, [4, 27, 1572
29, 30]. Many such methods may be useable for the 1573
purpose of online hazard analysis. It may be useful to 1574
provide these mechanisms with information structures 1575
(knowledge bases, semantic networks, or similar) that 1576
encode the ESHA guidewords classification scheme, 1577
to ensure that the robot develops an analysis that is an 1578
extension of the initial human analysis done at design 1579
time. We aim to investigate this idea in future work. 1580
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8.3 Future Work1581
Future work in this area of research is likely to proceed1582
in the following directions:1583
• The current experiments and trials have tended to1584
focus on wheeled robots used in urban or domes-1585
tic environments. We are interested in applying1586
ESHA to different domains and applications of1587
robotics, such as UAVs and AUVs, remote manip-1588
ulation / tele-robotics in medicine, space and other1589
environments. This will be useful in developing1590
and adapting the guide words for ESHA, which1591
may at the present time contain biases towards the1592
applications we have considered so far.1593
• To date we have taken a breadth-first approach to1594
our application trials, by studying as many dif-1595
ferent applications as practicable in the time and1596
opportunities available, but to a relatively shallow1597
(incomplete) extent. We did this to get as early1598
an understanding as possible of the relevance and1599
validity of the proposed ESHA guideword set and1600
classification scheme. In future work, we propose1601
to develop an in-depth, full and complete ESHA1602
on an application; this will evaluate explicitly our1603
claim that the method is comprehensive enough to1604
claim that all reasonably foreseeable hazards can1605
be identified for a given environment.1606
• Other safety analysis methods may be useful for1607
the analysis of robotic systems. In particular, a rel-1608
atively new hazard analysis methodology called1609
STAMP [31] shows promise as it may also be1610
usable as an externally focused analysis that may1611
also offer a method of identifying non-mission1612
interactions. We are interested in investigating this1613
method in future case studies.1614
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Appendix A: Hierarchical Task Analysis1620
The highest level of abstraction in the functional spec-1621
ification of a system is to model the system as a single1622
element (often called a ‘black box’ specification) and1623
to define its interaction with the environment. Typi- 1624
cally, this requires a specification of the tasks to be 1625
performed by the system, from the viewpoint of exter- 1626
nal observers, agents or stakeholders. Many methods 1627
exist for specifying the externally-observed function- 1628
ality of a system, including Use Case Design, User 1629
Stories, and Viewpoints-based Requirements Engi- 1630
neering. However, for the BRL Robot Waiter design 1631
study, a method called Hierarchical Task Analysis was 1632
used. 1633
Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) [23] is a sys- 1634
tem analysis method that has been developed by the 1635
Human Factors Analysis community as a method 1636
for eliciting the procedures and action sequences by 1637
which a system is used by human operators. System 1638
and procedural models identified by HTA are then 1639
used as the basis for operator error analyses to deter- 1640
mine whether the system functional or user interface 1641
design has an increased potential for of hazards due to 1642
human error. 1643
In addition to its use as a methodology for Human 1644
Factors analysis, HTA may also be useful as a design 1645
technique for mobile robots and other intelligent 1646
autonomous systems. The tasks identified within HTA 1647
are descriptions of the externally-viewed behaviour 1648
required of a robot, which strongly resemble the task 1649
modules or behaviour modules developed in many 1650
system architectures used widely within the mobile 1651
robotics domain (behaviour based architectures). Fur- 1652
thermore, the hierarchical organisation of tasks pro- 1653
duced by HTA also resembles the layered hierarchies 1654
of tasks that typical of many behaviour-based archi- 1655
tectural schemes, such as Subsumption Architecture 1656
[5]. 1657
Therefore, it is hypothesized that HTA might be 1658
a useful candidate for a high level system require- 1659
ments elicitation technique, generating behavioural 1660
(task-based) models of the functionality required of an 1661
autonomous robot and identifying their relative hier- 1662
archical ordering, without making assumptions about 1663
the manner of their implementation. This enhances the 1664
utility of HTA as a requirements technique, as it pro- 1665
vides maximum freedom of choice to designers in the 1666
selection of implementation schemes. 1667
HTA proceeds by the identification of the tasks 1668
required of the system, and identification of plans, 1669
which describe the order in which tasks are to be per- 1670
formed. Tasks are described by the general activity to 1671
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0: Deliver ordered drinks to 
customer
1: Wait for new 
customer 2: Get Order 3: Get Drink
4: Deliver 
Drink
5: Resolve 
customer 
satisfaction
6: Resolve missing / 
unavailable drink
7: Resolve 
missing 
customer
PLAN 0:
Normal sequence: 1,2,3,4
If (DRINK_UNAVAILABLE): do 6
If (DRINK_RESTORED): do 4
If (CANCELLATION_HAS_BEEN_EXPLAINED): do 2
If (DELIVERY_FAILED): do 7
If (CUSTOMER_FOUND): do 4 with a new customer location
1.1: Go to 
standby 
location
1.2: 
Scan 
room
1.3: Indicate 
recognition
Plan 1
3.1: Go to 
drink 
location
3.2: Pick 
up drink
Plan 3
4.1: Go to 
standby 
location
4.2: 
Scan 
room
4.3: Indicate 
recognition
Plan 4
5.1: Ask 
satisfaction 
question
Plan 5
5.2: Handle 
customer 
choice
5.3: Take drink 
back from 
customer
5.4: Take 
drink back 
to bar
4.1: Go to 
standby 
location
4.2: 
Scan 
room
4.3: Indicate 
recognition
Plan 4
Fig. 7 Partial hierarchical task diagram example for BRL robot waiter design study
be performed and/or the desired end state of the sys-1672
tem and its environment at the end of the activity. Each1673
task is then successively decomposed into sub-tasks1674
by the same procedure, as far as is reasonable for the1675
purpose of the analysis. Each task is accompanied by1676
its own plan specifying the ordering of the sub-tasks.1677
The results can also be used in the construction of a1678
hierarchical task diagram that presents the organisa-1679
tional structure of the tasks in a graphical format. An1680
example HTA task diagram is shown in Fig. 7.1681
The tasks are numbered hierarchically (1, 2.1,1682
3.2.1, etc.) according to its layer of decomposition,1683
and their associated task plans take the same number.1684
Each task plan is described in a standard format:1685
• The normal sequence, which describes the1686
intended sequence of execution of the principal1687
sub-tasks necessary to achieve the objective of the1688
task under nominal environmental circumstances.1689
• Alternate sequences may be defined for the sub-1690
tasks, which cater for specific circumstances1691
which may occur but are not considered to be1692
handled by the normal sequence. Typically alter-1693
nate sequences will be triggered by changes in the1694
environmental conditions that initiated the nor- 1695
mal sequence, which obviate that sequence and 1696
require further activity to restore the robot and 1697
its environment to a nominal state. To take an 1698
example from the BRL Robot Waiter study, if 1699
a customer leaves the cafe´ while the robot is 1700
fetching the drink they ordered, then the robot 1701
must return the ordered drink to the bar before 1702
returning to its waiting location. The sequence 1703
“return drink” and “return to waiting location” 1704
form an alternate sequence to the normal sequence 1705
for delivering the ordered drink. Other candi- 1706
date alternate sequences might include emergency 1707
actions, fail-safe actions, or user-choice actions. 1708
In addition to hierarchical task diagrams, an alterna- 1709
tive tabular format for presenting the task structure is 1710
shown in Table 14. This table shows an extension to Q101711
the tabular format that was added in the BRL Robot 1712
Waiter design study, where for each task the behaviour 1713
type was identified as defined in the NASA Goddard 1714
Agent reference model. This was done to facilitate the 1715
development of a functional architecture model on top 1716
of the basic task specification. This is described in 1717
Appendix B. 1718
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Appendix B: Use of the NASA Goddard Reference 1719
Architecture as a System Model 1720
In the BRL Robot Waiter experiment, we decided to 1721
use the NASA Goddard Agent Architecture [33] as 1722
a reference model for the robot functional architec- 1723
ture design. This model identifies the general nature of 1724
the cognitive processing required in order to perform 1725
behavioural tasks of a given type. The components of 1726
the architecture model are shown in Fig. 8. 1727
The architecture model identifies a number of 1728
cognitive processes that must be present within an 1729
autonomous agent if it is to perform various different 1730
types of task: 1731
• Perceptors observe the environment and provide 1732
signals or indications (percepts) that reflect the 1733
state or condition of the environment. Perceptors 1734
may be more than just a sensor; they may include 1735
some level of signal processing in order to pro- 1736
vide a particular item of information to the other 1737
cognitive processes of the agent. Perceptors also 1738
provide more primitive signals to the effectors, for 1739
the purposes of performing reflexive behaviour 1740
patterns (see later). 1741
• Effectors are the actuators, motors, muscles, or 1742
other transducers that act physically upon the 1743
environment. Effectors may either perform phys- 1744
ical activity, or they may provide other forms of 1745
emission of information, materiel or energy into 1746
the environment. 1747
• The Agent Communications process performs 1748
explicit message-based communications directed 1749
specifically to other agents. This is the primary 1750
cognitive process associated with social behaviour 1751
patterns, which involve dialogue rather than just 1752
physical actions. 1753
• The Execution process is responsible for decid- 1754
ing upon the specific actions to be taken in order 1755
to achieve the steps of a given plan (provided by 1756
other processes). It can be thought of as the lowest 1757
level of action planning within the agent. Actions 1758
are specified based on the action plan and the state 1759
of the world as supplied by the Agenda and the 1760
Modelling & State processes. 1761
• The Modelling and State process provides the 1762
storage of all data, information or knowledge 1763
required by the agent, typically in the form of 1764
world models or knowledge bases. In general it is 1765
a passive component, merely providing a storage 1766
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and retrieval service to other processes. However,1767
occasionally it may be the source of internally1768
triggered or motivated behaviour patterns, if any1769
specific data/information patterns occur within1770
the world model.1771
• The Agent Reasoning process is the source of1772
all logical inference and reasoning within the1773
agent. It encodes the primary goals of the agent,1774
and invokes the necessary deliberative, social 1775
or reflexive behaviours needed to achieve them. 1776
This process is the principal source of internally 1777
motivated (proactive) behaviour, although other 1778
processes may also do so (as above). 1779
• The Planning and Scheduling process is respon- 1780
sible for the generation and monitoring of 1781
action plans that achieve the goals generated by 1782
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Fig. 10 Reactive 1
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the Agent Reasoning process. This process is1783
intended to perform only a high level planning1784
process (management or supervisory), selecting1785
from a range of more specific plans, monitoring1786
their completion, and reacting to failures with the1787
selection of new plans.1788
• The Agenda process is responsible for the lower1789
level of planning, identifying the action steps1790
required to achieve the high level plans supplied1791
by the Planning & Scheduling Process. It passes1792
the individual action steps to the Execution pro-1793
cess, monitors their successful completion, and1794
then advises the Planning & Scheduling process 1795
as to whether a given plan has been performed 1796
successfully (or otherwise). 1797
The processes shown in Fig. 8 define the internal cog- 1798
nitive mechanisms required of an agent. The Goddard 1799
Agent Architecture Model also identifies a number of 1800
different types of behaviour pattern that an agent may 1801
exhibit: 1802
• Reactive: reasoned action initiated by events in 1803
the environment 1804
Fig. 11 Reactive 2
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Fig. 12 Proactive
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• Reflexive: fixed/stereotyped action pattern initi-1805
ated directly by percepts1806
• Deliberative: reasoned and planned action initi-1807
ated by external events1808
• Proactive: action initiated by the agent itself due1809
to internal motivations1810
• Social: dialogue with other agent(s) which may1811
also trigger action1812
These basic behaviour types are then extended by con-1813
sideration of how the behaviour may be triggered or1814
initiated, thereby producing a list of eight specific 1815
behaviour modes: 1816
1. Reactive 1: triggered by another agent 1817
2. Reactive 2: triggered by a percept 1818
3. Reflexive 1819
4. Deliberative 1: triggered by another agent 1820
5. Deliberative 2: triggered by a percept 1821
6. Proactive 1822
7. Social 1: triggered by another agent 1823
8. Social 2: triggered by the agent itself 1824
Fig. 13 Deliberative 1
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Fig. 14 Deliberative 2
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The Goddard Agent Architecture Model identifies1825
how the cognitive processes combine to perform each1826
behaviour mode by modelling the information flow1827
through the process model. The various different1828
information flow archetypes are presented in Figs.1829
9–16.1830
Although the Goddard Agent Architecture refer-1831
ence model is presented as a block diagram suggesting1832
that the constituent processes must be thought of as1833
an implementation, it need not be interpreted in this1834
way. The model is intended to define the cognitive1835
processes of an agent, not necessarily the software 1836
processes. There does necessarily need to be a one-to- 1837
one correspondence between the cognitive processes 1838
required of an agent and the software algorithms that 1839
are programmed into its computational equipment. 1840
Instead, the model may be interpreted as a statement of 1841
the functional requirements for performing behaviours 1842
of a given type, which could be implemented by other 1843
architectures as appropriate, as long as the cognitive 1844
processes necessary are allocated to the elements of 1845
the implementation architecture. 1846
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Fig. 16 Social 2 behaviour
Thus, it is possible to use the Goddard Agent1847
Architecture Model as a reference model for func-1848
tional requirements for the primitive processes of1849
the task model, to identify the internal functional-1850
ity they require. This can then be used in further1851
design studies such as functional hazard/failure analy-1852
sis, by providing some information about the internal1853
functional processes of the system, but still retaining1854
considerable freedom about how the design may be1855
implemented.1856
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